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Despite provable unknowables in recursion theory, indeterminism and randomness in physics is
confined to conventions, subjective beliefs and preliminary evidence. The history of the issue is very
briefly reviewed, and answers to five questions raised by Hector Zenil are presented.
PACS numbers: 01.65.+g,01.70.+w,02.10.-v,02.50.Ey,05.45.-a
Keywords: Indeterminism, stochasticity, randomness in physics, halting problem, induction
It is not totally unreasonable to speculate if and why
the universe we experience with our senses and brains
appears to be “(un)lawful.” Indeed, the “unreason-
able effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sci-
ences” [1] seems mind-boggling and tantamount to our
(non)existence. Beyond belief, there do not seem to ex-
ist a priori answers to such questions which would be
forced upon us, say maybe by consistency constraints.
But then, why should consistency and logic be consid-
ered sacrosanct?
In view of the opaqueness of the issues, a fierce con-
troversy between supporters and opponents of a “clock-
work universe” versus “cosmic chaos” has developed from
antiquity onwards — cf., e.g., Aristotle’s comments on
the Pythagoreans in Physics, as well as Epicurus’ Letter
to Menoeceus. Indeed, for the sake of purported truth,
many varieties of conceivable mixtures of determinism
and chance have been claimed and repudiated.
The author has argued elsewhere [2] that there
are many emotional reasons (not) to believe in a(n)
(in)deterministic universe: does it not appear frightening
to be imprisoned by remorseless, relentless predetermina-
tion; and, equally frightening, to accept one’s fate as be-
ing contingent on total arbitrariness and chance? What
merits and what efforts appear worthy at these extreme
positions, which also unmask freedom, self-determination
and human dignity as an idealistic illusion?
In order to disentangle the scientific discussion of top-
ics such as (in)determinism, or realism versus idealism,
from emotional overtones and possible bias, it might not
be totally unreasonable to allow oneself the contempla-
tive strategy of evenly-suspended attention outlined by
Freud [3]: Nature is thereby treated as a “client-patient,”
and whatever comes up is accepted “as is,” without any
immediate emphasis or judgment[4].
∗ Hector Zenil posted the following five questions: “Why were
you initially drawn to the study of computation and ran-
domness?”, “What have we learned?”, “What don’t we know
(yet)?”, “What are the most important open problems in
the field?”, “What are the prospects for progress?”, at URL
http://www.mathrix.org/experimentalAIT/RandomnessBook.htm,
accessed on May 1st, 2009.
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In more recent history, the European Enlightenment
(illuminating also wide areas across the oceans) has
brought about the belief of total causality and almost
unlimited predictability, control, and manipulative ca-
pacities. Subsequently, the principle of sufficient rea-
son came under pressure at two independent frontiers:
Poincare´’s discovery of instabilities in classical many-
body motion [5], as already envisioned by Maxwell [6,
pp. 211-212], is now considered as a precursor to deter-
ministic chaos, in which the information “held” in the
initial value “unfolds” through a deterministic process.
Note that, with probability one, an arbitrary real number
representing the initial value, which is “grabbed” (facili-
tated by the axiom of choice) from the “continuum urn,”
is provable random in the sense of algorithmic informa-
tion theory [7–9]; i.e., in terms of algorithmic incompress-
ibility as well as of the equivalent statistical tests. More-
over, for entirely different reasons, if one encodes uni-
versal computation into a system on n bodies, then by
reduction (cf. below) to the halting problem of recur-
sion theory [10–15], certain observables become provable
unknowable [16].
A second attack against determinism erupted through
the development of quantum theory. Despite fierce resis-
tance of Einstein[17], Schro¨dinger and De Brogli, Born
expressed the new quantum canon, repeated by the
“mainstream” ever after [18], as follows (cf. Ref. [19,
p. 866], English translation in [20, p. 54])[21]:
“From the standpoint of our quantum me-
chanics, there is no quantity which in any in-
dividual case causally fixes the consequence of
the collision; but also experimentally we have
so far no reason to believe that there are some
inner properties of the atom which condition
a definite outcome for the collision. Ought we
to hope later to discover such properties [[. . .]]
and determine them in individual cases? Or
ought we to believe that the agreement of the-
ory and experiment — as to the impossibility
of prescribing conditions for a causal evolu-
tion — is a pre-established harmony founded
on the nonexistence of such conditions? I my-
self am inclined to give up determinism in the
world of atoms.”
2More specifically, Born offers a mixture of
(in)determinism: while postulating a probabilistic
behavior of individual particles, he accepts a determin-
istic evolution of the wave function (cf. [22, p. 804],
English translation in [23, p. 302])[24]:
“The motion of particles conforms to the
laws of probability, but the probability it-
self is propagated in accordance with the law
of causality. [This means that knowledge of
a state in all points in a given time deter-
mines the distribution of the state at all later
times.]”
In addition to the indeterminism associated with out-
comes of the measurements of single quanta, there appear
to be at least two other types of quantum unknowables.
One is complementarity, as first expressed by Pauli [25,
p. 7]. A third type of quantum indeterminism was dis-
covered by studying quantum probabilities, in particular
the consequences of Gleason’s theorem [26]: whereas the
classical probabilities can be constructed by the convex
sum of all two-valued measures associated with classical
truth tables, the structure of elementary yes–no proposi-
tions in quantum mechanics associated with projectors in
three- or higher-dimensional Hilbert spaces do not allow
any two-valued measure [27, 28]. One of the consequences
thereof is the impossibility of a consistent co-existence
of the outcomes of all conceivable quantum observables
(under the noncontextuality assumption [29] that mea-
surement outcomes are identical if they “overlap”).
Parallel to these developments in physics, Go¨del [30]
put an end to finitistic speculations in mathematics about
possibilities to encode all mathematical truth in a finite
system of rules. The recursion theoretic, formal unknow-
ables exhibit a novel feature: they present provable un-
knowables in the fixed axiomatic system in which they
are derived. (Note that incompleteness and undecidabil-
ity exist always relative to the particular formal system
or model of universal computation.) From ancient times
onwards, individuals and societies have been confronted
with a pandemonium of unpredictable behaviors and oc-
currences in their environments, sometimes resulting in
catastrophes. Often these phenomena were interpreted
as “God’s Will.” In more rationalistic times, one could
pretend without presenting a formal proof that certain
unpredictable behaviors are in principle deterministic, al-
though the phenomena cannot be predicted “for various
practical purposes” (“epistemic indeterminism”). Now
provable unknowables make a difference by being immune
to these kinds of speculation. The halting problem in
particular demonstrates the impossibility to predict the
behavior of deterministic systems in general; it also solves
the induction (rule inference) problem to the negative.
In order to be able to fully appreciate the impact of re-
cursion theoretic undecidability on physics [31–44], let us
sketch an algorithmic proof of the undecidability of the
halting problem; i.e., the decision problem of whether or
not a program p on a given finite input finishes running
(or will reach a particular halting state) or will run for-
ever. The proof method will use a reductio ad absurdum;
i.e., we assume the existence of a halting algorithm h(p)
deciding the halting problem of p, as well as some triv-
ial manipulations; thereby deriving a complete contradic-
tion. The only alternative to inconsistency appears to be
the nonexistence of any such halting algorithm. For the
sake of contradiction, consider an agent q(p) accepting
as input an arbitrary program (code) p. Suppose further
that it is able to consult a halting algorithm h(p), thereby
producing the opposite behavior of p: whenever p halts,
q “steers itself” into the halting mode; conversely, when-
ever p does not halt, q forces itself to halt. A complete
contradiction results from q’s behavior on itself, because
whenever q(q) detects (through h(q)) that it halts, it is
supposed not to halt; conversely if q(q) detects that it
does not halt, it is supposed to halt. Finally, since all
other steps in this “diagonal argument” with the excep-
tion of h are trivial, the contradiction obtained in apply-
ing q to its own code proves that any such program —
and in particular a halting algorithm h — cannot exist.
In physics, analogous arguments embedding a univer-
sal computer into a physical substrate yield provable un-
decidable observables via reduction to the halting prob-
lem. Note that this argument neither means that the
system does not evolve deterministically on a step-by-
step basis, nor implies that predictions are provable im-
possible for all cases; that would be clearly misleading
and absurd! A more quantitative picture arises if we
study the potential growth of “complexity” of determin-
istic systems in terms of their maximal capability to
“grow” before reaching a halting state through the Busy
Beaver function [45–48]. Another consequence is the re-
cursive unsolvability of the general induction (or rule in-
ference [49–53]) problem for deterministic systems. As an
immediate consequence of these findings it follows that
no general algorithmic rule or operational method [54] ex-
ists which could “extract” some rather general law from a
(coded) sequence. (Note again that it still may be possi-
ble to extract laws from “low-complex” sequences; possi-
bly with some intuition and additional information.) Nor
can there be certainty that some sequence denominated
“random” is not generated by a decompression algorithm
which makes it formally nonrandom; a fact well known in
recursion and algorithmic information theory [8, 55] but
hardly absorbed by the physics community. Thereby,
to quote Shakespeare’s Prospero, any claims of absolute
(“ontological”) randomness decay into “thin air.” Of
course, one could still vastly restrict the domain of possi-
ble laws and define a source to be random if it “performs
well” with respect to the associated, very limited collec-
tion of statistical tests, a strategy adapted by the Swiss
Federal Office of Metrology[56].
Despite the formal findings reviewed above, which sug-
gest that claims of absolute indeterminacy cannot be
proven but represent subjective beliefs, their predomi-
nance in the physics community can be understood, or
rather motivated, by the obvious inability to account for
3physical events, such as the outcomes of certain quantum
measurements, e.g., radioactive decays [57, 58], determin-
istically. Why this effective incapacity to predict individ-
ual outcomes or time series of measurement data should
be different from other “classical” statistical sources of
randomness — even when complementarity and value
indefiniteness is taken into account — remains an open
question, at least from a formal point of view.
For the sake of explicit demonstration, let us consider
a particular method of generation of a sequence from sin-
gle quantum outcomes [59] by combination of source and
beam splitter [60–68]. Ideally (to employ quantum com-
plementarity as well as quantum value indefiniteness),
a system allowing three or more outcomes is prepared
to be in a particular pure state “contained” in a cer-
tain context (maximal observable [69] or block [70, 71]),
and then measured “along” a different context not con-
taining the observable corresponding to that pure state.
All outcomes except two are discarded [8, 72], and the
two remaining outcomes are mapped onto the symbols
“0” and “1,” respectively. If independence of individ-
ual “quantum coin tosses” is assumed — a quite non-
trivial assumption in view of the Hanbury Brown and
Twiss effect and other statistical correlations — the con-
catenation and algorithmic normalization [73, 74] of sub-
sequent recordings of these encoded outcomes yield an
“absolutely random sequence” relative to the unprovable
axiomatic assumption of quantum randomness. Since all
such operational physical sequences are finite, algorith-
mic information theory [8] applies to them in a limited,
finite sense. Particular care should be given to the diffi-
culties in associating an algorithmic information measure
to “nontrivial” sequences of finite length.
In summary, there are two principal sources of inde-
terminism and randomness in physics: the first source
is the deterministic chaos associated with instabilities of
classical physical systems, and with the strong depen-
dence of their future behavior on the initial value; the
second source is quantum indeterminism, which can be
subdivided into three subcategories: random outcomes
of individual events, complementarity, and value indefi-
niteness.
The similarities and differences between classical and
quantum randomness can be conceptualized in terms of
two “black boxes:” the first one of them — called the
“Poincare´ box” — containing a classical, deterministic
chaotic, source of randomness; the second — called the
“Born box” — containing a quantum source of random-
ness, such as a quantized system including a beam split-
ter. Suppose an agent is being presented with both boxes
without any label on, or hint about, them; i.e., the origin
of indeterminism is unknown to the agent. In a mod-
ified Turing test, the agent’s task would be to find out
which is the Born and which is the Poincare´ box by solely
observing their output.
It is an open question whether it is possible, by study-
ing the output behavior of the “Poincare´ box” and the
“Born box” alone, to differentiate between them. In the
absence of any criterion, there should not exist any opera-
tional method or procedure discriminating amongst these
boxes. Both types of indeterminism appear to be based
on metaphysical assumptions: in the classical case it is
the existence of continua and the possibility to “choose”
elements thereof, representing the initial values; in the
quantum case it is the irreducible indeterminism of sin-
gle events.
It would indeed be tempting also to compare the per-
formance of these physical “oracles of indeterminism”
with algorithmic cyclic pseydorandom generators, and
with irrationals such as pi. In recent studies [75] the lat-
ter, deterministic, ones seem to be doing pretty well.
In the author’s conviction, the postulate of quantum
randomness as well as physical randomness emerging
from the continuum will be maintained by the commu-
nity of physicists at large unless somebody comes up with
evidence to the contrary. This pragmatic interpretation
of the phenomena appears reasonable if and only if re-
searchers are aware of its relativity with respect to the
tests and attempts of falsification involved; and also ac-
knowledge the tentativeness and conventionality of their
assumptions.
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